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LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR HARM
CAUSED BY NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES
JON M. VAN DYKE1

I.

INTRODUCTION

The body of customary international environmental law has its foundation in
cases such as the Trail Smelter Arbitration,2 which utilized the no-harm rule and
the polluter-pays principle, and it is now drawing upon more specific norms that
build on these earlier rules, such as the precautionary principle and the principle of
sustainable development. The specific obligation to provide restitution and
compensation when nuclear activities cause injuries has been recognized
repeatedly and is now certainly part of customary international law. But problems
remain regarding how to measure damages, how to implement the duty to repair
the injuries, and what specific obligations exist to protect neighboring states from
transboundary pollution.
II. RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRANSBOUNDARY INJURY TO PERSONS, PROPERTY, AND
THE ENVIRONMENT
A. The No-Harm Rule (Sic Utere Tuo Ut Alienum Non Laedas - One Should Use
One's PropertySo As to Avoid Injuring Others)
Customary international law requires states to ensure that activities under
their jurisdiction do not cause damage to the resources, people, or environment of
other states. This principle was applied in the Trail Smelter Arbitration3 and has
been repeatedly embodied in later treaties, conventions, and international
decisions. The United States brought an action against Canada for sulfur dioxide
emissions produced by a smelter in Trail, British Columbia, which damaged
private timber and agricultural property in Washington State. The International
Joint Commission, established by the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 between
the two states, arbitrated the dispute. It held Canada liable for more than $350,000
in damages and ordered Canada to refrain from causing further damages. The
Commission examined international decisions as well as disputes between U.S.
states, because the arbitration agreement indicated that U.S. law could be

1. The author would like to thank Jamie Tanabe, Svitlana Campbell, and Sechyi Laui, law
students at the William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii at Manoa, classes of 2002,
2006, and 2007 respectively, for their assistance with some of the research in this paper.
2. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1938 & 1941) [hereinafter Trail Smelter
Arbitration](no-harm rule at 1965; polluter-pays principle at 1980-81).
3. Id. at 1965.
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considered. Based on these precedents, the Commission concluded that "no State
has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause
injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein,
when the case is of serious
consequence and the injury is established by clear and
4
convincing evidence."
The responsibility of Canada in the Trail Smelter Arbitration did not result
from any intentional or invidious action taken by Canada, and wrongful intent was
not necessary for the activity to become "an internationally wrongful act."
Canada's responsibility flowed simply from its breach of a duty it owed to its
neighbor, a duty to prevent activities within its jurisdiction from causing harm to
persons, property, and the environment of the United States. One commentator
explained that the earlier efforts of the International Law Commission to
differentiate between lawful and unlawful acts were based on a false dichotomy
and led to a non sequitur:
The fact that operating a smelting plant is permitted by international law
does not necessarily mean that all acts committed in the course of that
activity are permitted by international law: the activity of operating a
smelting plant is lawful, but the act of discharging fumes from that
plant is not lawful. The discharge of fumes arises out of an activity
which is permitted by international law, but the discharge itself is an act
5
which is not permitted by international law.
In its more recent 2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, the International Law Commission has recognized
that international liability does not require wrongful intent, and it now defines
"internationally wrongful act of a Sta':e" in the following simple terms: "There is
an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or
omission: (a) is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) constitutes
a breach of an international obligation of the State." 6 The Commentary to this
article explains that "[c]ases in which the international responsibility of a State has
been invoked on the basis of an omission are at least as numerous as those based
on positive acts, and no difference in principle exists between the two." 7
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) recognized state responsibility for
damage to one country caused by activities within the jurisdiction of another
country in the 1949 Corfu Channel Case.8 The United Kingdom brought a claim
against Albania when two of its warships were damaged by mines in the Straits of
Corfu within Albania's territorial waters. Albania was aware of the dangers but
did not announce the existence of the mines. In holding Albania responsible, the

4. Id.
5. M.B. Akehurst, InternationalLiabilityfor Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not
Prohibitedby InternationalLaw, 16 NETH. Y.B. INT'L. L. 3, 8 (1985).
6. JAMES

CRAWFORD,

THE
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ARTICLES
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(2002) [hereinafter ILC ARTICLES].

7. Id. at 82.
8. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
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ICJ held that it is "every State's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to
9
be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States." This case is particularly
significant because it speaks in terms of an "obligation" on the part of Albania to
ensure that others are not injured by dangers within its jurisdiction, and because the
United Kingdom vessels knew that dangers lurked in the Corfu Channel when they
sailed through. The Court ruled that the responsibility of Albania was not in any
way reduced because the U.K. ships may have been contributorily negligent in
sailing through these waters. 10
The 1972 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, also known as the
Stockholm Conference, formally adopted the no-harm principle for environmental
damage. The purpose of the Stockholm Conference was to "serve as a practical
means to encourage, and to provide guidelines for, action by governments and
international organizations designed to protect and improve the human
environment, and to remedy and prevent its impairment, by means of international
co-operation. ' "

It confirmed the Trail Smelter holding in Principle 21, stating

that:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and
the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their
own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of
areasbeyond the limits of nationaljurisdiction.12

Principle 21 has developed into "the cornerstone of international
environmental law," 13 and was confirmed again in Principle 2 of the Rio
Declaration, which emerged from the 1992 Conference on Environment and
Development. 14 This principle has become important because "as it has been
applied in subsequent law-making, [it] requires states to do more than make
reparation for environmental damage. Its main importance is that it recognizes the

9. Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
10. Id. at 35-36; Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27)
(holding that the United States violated international law by failing to warn other states that it had
planted mines in Nicaragua's harbors).
11. G.A. Res. 2581, 2, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (Dec. 15,
1969).
12. U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, June 5-16, 1972, Declaration of Principles,
Principle 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 (June 16, 1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration](emphasis
added).
13. PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 236 (2d ed. 2003).
14. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, Principle 2. U.N. Doe. A/Conf.151/26/Rev. 1 (Jan. 1, 1993) [hereinafter
Rio Declaration](Stating that, "States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and
the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their
own environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction").
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15
duty of states to take suitablepreventive measures to protect the environment.'
6

This duty is thus one of exercising both due diligence and harm prevention.'

The obligation of due diligence "requires the introduction of legislation and
administrative controls applicable to public and private conduct which are capable
of effectively protecting other states and the global environment, and it can be
expressed as the conduct to be expected of a good government."' 7 The due
diligence standard has sometimes been criticized as elusive and too flexible, and it
necessarily is relative and responsive to the situation requiring "diligence." One
scholar has explained that "during the course of legal development," due diligence
"has been defined to mean what a responsible government should do under normal
conditions in a situation with its best practicable and available means, with a view
to fulfilling its international obligation."' 18 But, even though the response of a
government will vary depending on its abilities to respond, when the government
itself is involved in the risk-creating activity, either as initiator or as regulator of it,
its responsibility to protect the interests of its neighbors is necessarily at the
highest possible level: "When an activity bears a significant risk of transboundary
damage the government must take all necessary measures to prevent such

damage."19
The no-harm rule can be found in Article 194(2) of the 1982 U.N. Law of the
Sea Convention 20 and in the Preamble of the 1992 U.N. Framework Convention on
Climate Change, which says:
Recalling also that States have, in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental
and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that
activities within theirjurisdictionor control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.21

The International Court of Justice said explicitly in 1996 that "the general
obligation of states to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control
respect the environment of other states or of areas beyond national control is now

15. PATRICIA W. BIRNIE AND ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE ENVIRONMENT 11 l
(2d ed. 2002) (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 112.
17. Id.
18. XUE HANQiN, TRANSBOUNDARY DAMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 163 (2003).
19. Id. (emphasis added).
20. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 194(2), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 (art. 194(2) states: "States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their
jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other States and their
environment, and that pollution arising from incidents or activities under their jurisdiction or control
does not spread beyond the areas where they exercise sovereign rights in accordance with this
Convention").
21. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Preamble, May 9, 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107 (emphasis added).
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part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment., 22 Claims for
transboundary harm can be brought based on several distinct theories:
Nuisance, which refers to excessive and unreasonable hindrance to the
private utilization or enjoyment of real property... Trespass,... direct
and immediate physical intrusion into the immovable property of
another person... Negligence... [T]he doctrine of public trust... and
that of riparian rights... [N]eighborhood law (duty of owner of a
property or installation, especially one carrying industrial activities, to
abstain from any excesses which may be detrimental to the neighbour's
property)... 23
The claim brought by Australia and New Zealand against France in the early
1970s challenging the atmospheric testing in French Polynesia,24 for instance, was
based on a theory of trespass, i.e., that the radionuclides produced by the testing
entered into the airspace of Australia and New Zealand thereby causing harm to
persons and property.
B. The Duty to Control Sources ofHarm
Professor Boyle has usefully explained that governing principles of customary
international law require countries "to take adequate steps to control and regulate
sources of serious environmental pollution or transboundary harm within their
territory or subject to their jurisdiction., 25 This principle is designed to protect not
only other states but also "common spaces including the high seas, deep sea-bed
and outer space, and also the atmosphere, from pollution."26
C. The Polluter-PaysPrinciple
It is a central principle of international law that when a state violates its
international obligations, it has a duty to make reparations for the wrongs
committed. This is a logical rule because "the function of any regime of allocation
of loss should be to provide an incentive for those concerned with the hazardous
operations to take preventive or protective measures in order to avoid damage; to
compensate damage caused to any victim; and to serve an economic function, that
is, internalize all the costs (externalities)." 27 The Permanent Court of International
Justice (PCIJ) in the Factory at Chorz6w Case stated that "reparation must, as far
as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the
situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been
22. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 24142, (July 8). See also Gabcikovo Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 53 (Sept. 25).
23. International Law Commission, FirstReport on the Legal Regime for Allocation of Loss in
Case of TransboundaryHarm Arising Out of HazardousActivities, 123, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/531 (Mar. 21, 2003) (preparedby Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, Special Rapporteur)
[hereinafter Rao].
24. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 99 (Dec. 20, 1974).; Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. France),
1973 I.C.J. 135 (Dec. 20, 1974).
25. Alan E. Boyle, Nuclear Energy and International Law: An Environmental Perspective, 60
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 257, 269 (1990).
26. Id. at271.
27. Rao, supra note 23, at 45.

VOL. 35:1

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

committed., 28 The ICJ also recognized in the Gabcikovo Case that "[i]t is a wellestablished rule of international law that an injured State is entitled to obtain
compensation from the State which has committed an internationally wrongful act
for the damage caused by it." 29 This rule was reaffirmed by the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in its first full opinion, The M/V Saiga Case.3"
When addressing the question of damages, the Tribunal quoted from the venerable
Factory at Chorz6w Case3 1 for the proposition that every wrong requires a
remedy:
It is a well-established rule of international law that a State which
suffers damage as a result of an internationally wrongful act by another
State is entitled to obtain reparation for the damage suffered from the
State which committed the wrongful act and that "reparation must, as
far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and
reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if
that act had not been committed" (Factory at Chorz6w, Merits,
Judgment No. 13, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17, p. 47).2
Pursuant to this standard, the Tribunal awarded $2,123,357 to Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines for damages resulting from the detention of the Saiga, the
damage to the vessel, and the injury to the crewmembers. 33 This principle is also
codified as Principle 17 of the 1992 Rio Declaration:
National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of
environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into
account the approach that the pollutershould, in principle, bearthe cost
ofpollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting
34
international trade and investment.

1II.

OTHER PRINCIPLES GOVERNING How COUNTRIES MUST DEAL
ACTIVITIES THAT AFFECT THEIR NEIGHBORS

WITH

Among the other principles of international law relevant to transboundary
environmental conflicts are the duty to cooperate, stewardship, sustainable
development, the protection of biological diversity, the precautionary principle or
approach, intra-generational (social) equity, inter-generational equity, and
indigenous rights. Those particularly relevant to this discussion are addressed in
more detail below.
A. PrecautionaryPrinciple
The precautionary principle, which has evolved into a customary international
law norm, was confirmed in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, which states:
28.
29.
30.
1999).
31.
32.
33.
34.

Factory at Chorz6w, (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47 (Sept. 13).
Gabcikovo Nagymaros Project, supra note 22, at 152.
M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), 120 I.L.R. 143,
170 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea
Factory at Chorz6w, supranote 28.
M/V Saiga, supra note 30, at 170.
Id. at 175.
Rio Declaration,supra note 14, Principle 17 (emphasis added).
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In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack offull scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reasonfor postponing cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degradation.35
The precautionary principle continues to develop and is presently seen as an
authoritative norm recognized by governments and international organizations as a
firm guide to activities affecting the environment. 36 It flows directly from the
responsibility of "due diligence" that is a component of the no-harm rule and it
' 37
The essential
constitutes "an obligation of diligent prevention and control.
components of the precautionary principle are:
- Developments and initiatives affecting the environment should be
thoroughly assessed before action is taken.
- The burden is on the developer or initiator to establish that the new
program is safe.
" Alternative technologies should be explored.
" The absence of full scientific certainty should not limit precautionary
measures to protect the environment.
- Whenever serious or irreversible damage is anticipated, the action
should be postponed or canceled.
The precautionary principle has been somewhat controversial, because some
commentators view it as being too vague,38 and others view it as unrealistic, but it
is a major presence at all international negotiations now, and it appears regularly in
treaties and documents because it reflects the view that it is necessary to be extra
vigilant in our stewardship of resources, especially in light of the many mistakes
we have made in recent years. 39 Although the content of the precautionary
principle is still the subject of discussion, at a minimum it serves to reverse the
burden of proving that a certain activity does not or will not cause damage onto the

35. Id. at Principle 15 (emphasis added).
36. See, e.g., Jon M. Van Dyke, The Evolution and InternationalAcceptance of the Precautionary
Principle,in BRINGING NEW LAW TO OCEAN WATERS 357, 357 (David D. Caron and Harry N. Scheiber

eds., 2004).
37. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 15, at 115.
38. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, Scientific Uncertainty and the PrecautionaryPrinciple, 33 ENV'T
4, 8 (Sept. 1991) ("Although the precautionary principle provides a general approach to environmental
issues, it is too vague to serve as a regulatory standard because it does not specify how much caution
should be taken."). But see Daniel Bodansky, Remarks: New Developments in International
Environmental Law, 85 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 401, 413 (1991) ("Indeed, so frequent is its
invocation that some commentators are even beginning to suggest that the precautionary principle is
ripening into a norm of customary international law."). See generally James E. Hickey, Jr. & Vern R.
Walker, Refining the PrecautionaryPrinciple in InternationalEnvironmental Law, 14 VA. ENvTL. L.J.
423 (1995) and Gregory D. Fullem, The PrecautionaryPrinciple:EnvironmentalProtection in the Face
of Scientific Uncertainty, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 495 (1995).

39. See generally Jon M. Van Dyke, Applying the PrecautionaryPrincipleto Ocean Shipments of
Radioactive Materials,27 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 379 (1996).
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state seeking to initiate an environmentally sensitive activity. As Judge Wolfrum
expressed in his separate opinion in the MOX Plant Case:
There is no general agreement as to the consequences which flow from
the implementation of this principle other than the fact that the burden
of proof concerning the possible impact of a given activity is reversed.
A State interested in undertaking or continuing a particular activity has
to prove that such activities will not result in any harm,
rather than the
40
other side having to prove that it will result in harm."
Certainly the inclusion of the precautionary standard in the 1996 Protocol to
the London Dumping Convention 41 and in the 1995 Straddling and Migratory Fish
43
Stocks Agreement 42 provides strong evidence that this approach is here to stay.
The principle has been so universally included in recent treaties that it now appears
to have been accepted as a norm of customary international law that is formally
binding on all nations. 44 Several judges on the ICJ have recognized the
precautionary principle as an emerging concept in international law in cases such
46
45
as the 1995 Nuclear Tests Case and the 1996 Nuclear Weapons Case.
B. The Duty to Cooperate
Another principle well-established in customary international law is the
requirement that states cooperate in making decisions that may substantially affect
shared environmental resources. As Professor Boyle has explained in simple and
direct terms, "States are required to co-operate with each other in controlling
40. MOX Plant Case (No. 10) (Ir. v. U.K.), 41 I.L.M. 405 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2001) (opinion
of Judge Wolfrum) (emphasis added).
41. 1996 Protocol to the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter art. 3, Nov. 7, 1996, 36 I.L.M. I (reversing the presumptions established in the
original convention, so that the dumping of all wastes is prohibited unless the item to be dumped is
explicitly listed in Annex I).
42. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the U. N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks art. 5(c) and 6, Sept. 8, 1995, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/37, 34 I.L.M.
1542 (listing the "'precautionary approach" among the principles that govern conservation and
management of shared fish stocks and elaborating on this requirement in some detail, focusing on data
collection and monitoring).
43. E.g., Western Pacific Regional Fishery Management Council, A 20-Year Report 26 (1998)
(stating proudly that the Council has established "a precautionary management approach to fishery
conservation and management" as evidenced by its establishment of a moratorium and then a limitedentry program "in response to the rapid entry of longline vessels into the Hawaii-based fleet").
44. See generally Van Dyke, supra note 39.
45. Request for Examination of Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of Court's Judgment
of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. 288, 342, 412 (Sept. 22) (dissenting
opinion of Judge Weeramantry) (stating the precautionary principle is "gaining increasing support as
part of the international law of the environment") (dissenting opinion of Judge Palmer) (stating "the
norm involved in the precautionary principle has developed rapidly and may now be a principle of
customary international law relating to the environment").
46. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 240, 502
(July 8) (dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry) (stating "principles of environmental law, which
this Request enables the Court to recognize and use in reaching its conclusions, [include] the
precautionary principle").
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transboundary pollution and environmental risks.
Declaration states:

47

Principle 24 of the Stockholm

International matters concerning the protection and improvement of the
environment should be handled in a co-operative spirit by all countries,
big and small, on an equal footing. Cooperation through multilateral or
bilateral arrangements or other appropriate means is essential to
effectively control, prevent, reduce and eliminate adverse
environmental effects resulting from activities conducted in all spheres,
in such a way that due account is taken of the sovereignty and interests
of all States. as
This principle had earlier been utilized by the arbitral tribunal in the 1957 Lac
Lanoux Arbitration4 9 where it was held that, as a matter of customary international
law, a state that is engaging in behavior likely to impact the environment of
another state significantly is obliged to involve the affected state in discussions
regarding these activities.
The duty to consult includes the duty to notify other affected countries, the
duty to exchange information, the duty to listen to the concerns of affected
countries, the duty to respond to these concerns, and the duty to negotiate in good
faith. In some situations, countries also have the duty to reach an agreement, and a
duty to submit the dispute to third-party adjudication if they cannot resolve the
matter.
For instance, when an activity may have a significant transboundary affect on
ocean and coastal waters the Law of the Sea Convention requires the exchange of
information about the proposed activity and the preparation of an environmental
impact assessment to disclose the nature of the activity and the attendant risks.5 °
The Espoo Convention also requires an environmental impact assessment for
activities that are likely to cause a significant transboundary impact. 51 Along these
same lines, a state also has a duty to provide prior notification for transboundary
shipment of wastes. The Basel Convention 52 and the IAEA Code of Practice on
the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste 53 both require a
state to notify and obtain the consent of the sending, receiving and transit states in
accordance with their respective laws and regulations.

47. Boyle, supra note 25, at 278.
48. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 12, at Principle 24 (emphasis added).
49. Affaire du Lac Lanoux [Lake Lanoux Arbitration] (Fr. v. Spain), 12 R.I.A.A. 281 (1957).
50. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 20, art. 204-06.
51. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context art. 2.1, Feb.
25, 1991, 1989 U.N.T.S. 309 [hereinafter Espoo Convention] (requiring contracting parties to take all
appropriate measures to prevent, reduce, and control significant adverse transboundary environmental
impacts from proposed activities.).
52. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal art. 4, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 649.
53. Int'l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Code of Practice on the InternationalTransboundary
Movement of Radioactive Waste (IAEA Code), IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/386 (Nov. 13, 1990).
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The duty to cooperate played a central role in judgment of the International
Court of Justice in the Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-NagymarosDam,5 4 which,
as described by Professors Birnie and Boyle, had "it]he effect of.. .requir[ing] the
parties to co-operate in the joint management of the project, and to institute a
continuing process of environmental protection and monitoring...., 55 These
distinguished commentators have explained that "[t]he Court's environmental
jurisprudence is not extensive but its judgments affirm the existence of a legal
obligation to prevent transboundary harm, to co-operate in the management of
environmental risks, to utilize shared resources equitably and, albeit less certainly,
to carry out environmental impact assessment and monitoring. 56
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea confirmed the importance
of the duty to cooperate in two recent cases. In the MOX Plant Case (Ireland v.
U.K.), the Tribunal ruled on December 3, 2001 that the duty to cooperate required
the two countries to exchange information concerning the risks created by the
plant, to monitor the effects of the plant on the marine environment, and to work
together to reduce those risks.5 7 Similarly in the Case Concerning Land
Reclamation by Singapore In and Around the Straits of Johor, the Tribunal issued

a ruling on October 8, 2003, stating:
[G]iven the possible implications of land reclamation on the marine
environment, prudence and caution require that Malaysia and
Singapore establish mechanisms for exchanging information and
assessing the risks or effects of land reclamation works and devising
ways to deal with them in the areas concerned (emphasis added). 58

To give teeth to this duty to cooperate, the Tribunal went on to prescribe
provisional measures that the parties had to comply with:
Malaysia and Singapore shall cooperate and shall, for this purpose,
enter into consultations forthwith in order to:
(a) establishpromptly a group of independent experts with the mandate

(1) to conduct a study, on terms of reference to be agreed by Malaysia
and Singapore, to determine, within a period not exceeding one year
from the date of this Order, the effects of Singapore's land reclamation
and to propose, as appropriate, measures to deal with any adverse
effects of such land reclamation...
(b) exchange, on a regular basis, information on, and assess risks or
effects of Singapore's land reclamation works.. .(emphasis added). 59

54. Gabcikovo Nagymaros Project, supranote 22, at 147.
55. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 15, at 108.
56. Id.
57. MOX Plant Case, supra note 40.
58. Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore In and Around the Straits of Johor (No. 12)
(Malay. v. Sing.), 126 I.L.R. 487, 99 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2003).
59. Id. at 106(1).
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Finally, the Tribunal directed "Singapore not to conduct its land reclamation
in ways that might cause irreparable prejudice to the rights of Malaysia or serious
harm to the marine environment, taking especially into account the reports of the
group of independent experts. 6 °
C. Principlesof Equity
Principles of equity are also deeply rooted in customary international law.
The concept of inter-generational equity holds that "each generation is entitled to
inherit a robust planet that on balance is at least as good as that of previous
generations... As members of the present generation, we hold the earth in trust for
future generations.
At the same time, we are beneficiaries entitled to use and
6
benefit from it." 1
IV. DOES INTERNATIONAL LAW IMPOSE STRICT LIABILITY ON HAZARDOUS
ACTIVITIES THAT CAUSE HARM TO OTHER COUNTRIES?

For most injuries under most legal systems, the person who caused the injury
is liable only if that person acted "negligently," i.e., did not engage in the "due
diligence" required by the activity or situation. But for some activities and
situations, which by their very nature are risky and raise the possibility of serious
injuries, a higher standard of liability is utilized, usually characterized as "strict
liability."
Strict liability emerged in Anglo-American jurisprudence from the 1868 case
of Rylands v. Fletcher,62 where the House of Lords ruled that a "person who, for
his own purposes, brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to
do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is
prima facie answerable for all damage which is the natural consequence of its
escape. 63 One commentator has recently explained that "strict liability is not a
recent legal development for tortious injury, nor is it uncommon... [S]trict liability
in one form or another is imposed in many legal systems for damage caused by
[ultrahazardous] activity., 64 Although some commentators seem reluctant to
recognize this principle as applicable in international law, it appears increasingly in
international treaties, 65 and does seem to govern international decision-making.
60. Id. at 106(2).
61. Edith Brown Weiss, Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generationsfor the Environment,
84 AM. J. INT'L L.198, 199-200 (1990).

62. Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) 3 Eng. Rep. 330 (L.R.-P.C.).
63. Idat 339-40.
64. HANQIN, supra note 18, at 299-300.
65. See, e.g., Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to
the Environment, June 21, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1228; Basel Protocol, supra note 53; Convention on
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, March 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S.
No. 7762; Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear
Materials, Dec. 17, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 255, 11 I.L.M. 277; International Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damages, Nov. 29, 1969, 23 I.L.M. 177; Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for
Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, 1063 U.N.T.S. 265, 2 I.L.M.727; Convention on the Liability of
Operators of Nuclear Ships, May 25, 1962, 973 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on Third Party Liability in the
Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29, 1960, 956 U.N.T.S. 263; Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign
Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface, Oct. 7, 1952, 310 U.N.T.S. 181.
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One commentator has explained that "strict liability may result even though the
activity does not involve a high degree of risk if the risk carries with it66 the
dangerous.'
possibility of such widespread harm that it becomes 'abnormally
Although countries have been reluctant to accept the unlimited range of
responsibilities that might flow from a strict-liability regime, nonetheless they have
tended to accept their obligations to others when their activities have caused
unforeseen harms. As Robert Q. Quentin-Baxter, the first Special Rapporteur to
the International Law Commission on this topic, explained, "at the very end of the
day, when all the opportunities for regime-building have been set aside - or,
alternatively, when a loss or injury has occurred that nobody foresaw - there is a
''
commitment, in the nature of strict liability, to make good the lOSS. 67 "In the
absence of any agreement, the source State, according to Quentin-Baxter, was
nevertheless liable to make reparation to the affected State in conformity with the
shared expectations entertained by them.",68 His successor, P.S. Rao, has
confirmed that "there is general support for the proposition that any regime of
liability and compensation should aim at ensuring that the innocent victim is not as
far as possible left to bear the loss resulting from transboundary harm arising from
hazardous activity." 69 Later in his report, he phrased this in terms of a duty:
"States have a duty to ensure that some arrangement exists to guarantee equitable
allocation of loss."' 70 In his conclusions, he explained that states normally prefer to
avoid direct responsibility and that "liability and obligation to compensate should
be first placed at the doorstep of the person most in control of the activity at the
time the accident or incident occurred.", 71 If the liability of the operator is limited
in any way, then "[t]he limited liability should be supplemented by additional
funding... from the principal beneficiaries of the activity or from the same class of
operators or from earmarked State funds. 72 And, perhaps most importantly,
"[t]he State should also ensure that recourse is available within its legal system, in
accordance with evolving international standards, for equitable and expeditious
73
compensation and relief to victims of transboundary harm."
A. NuclearActivities in Particular
The operation of a nuclear reactor for the purpose of creating energy is not an
inherently "wrongful act," but it can constitute an "internationally wrongful act" if
the operation of the plant causes harm to the persons, property, or environment of a
neighboring state. If a nuclear accident were to occur, the operator would be
strictly liable for the damage that resulted and the state with jurisdiction over the
plant would also be responsible for providing restitution and compensation for the
66. John M. Kelson, State Responsibility and the Abnormally DangerousActivity, 13 HARV. INT'L
L. J. 197, 205 (1972).
67. Rao, supra note 23, at 18.
68. Id. at 8.
69. Id. at 44.
70. Id. at 151.
71. Id. at 153(d).
72. Id. at 153(g).
73. Id. at 153(i).
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resulting harm. Commentators appear to agree that nuclear activities are governed
by the strict-liability regime:
A good example of the special importance in international law is the
application of the doctrine of strict or absolute liability to operators or
agencies responsible for the manufacture, transportation, or use of
radioactive materials, activities that may result in injuries in the form of
pollution by radiation. 7
Professor Boyle has explained why strict liability is the logical standard to govern
nuclear activities:
The arguments for using a standard more demanding than due diligence
to shift the burden of unavoidable loss back to the polluting state remain
strong, particularly where the source is an ultra-hazardous activity, such
as a nuclear power plant. In the absence of reciprocal75 acceptance of
risk, making the victim suffer is not an attractive policy.

Several examples involving payments underscore the recognition that victims
who suffer injuries as a result of nuclear activities are entitled to restitution and
compensation, and that countries accept that they are strictly liable to provide such
remedies.
B. The Fukuryu Maru (Lucky Dragon) FalloutExposure (19541
Because of errors in calculating the magnitude of the explosion and the wind
direction, the March 1, 1954 hydrogen bomb test conducted by the United States in
the Marshall Islands caused injury to islanders and Americans in the region, and
also to the 27 Japanese crew members on the fishing vessel Fukuryu Maru (Lucky
Dragon). One member of the crew died and the rest sustained serious sickness and
injuries because of their exposure to the radiation.76 A year later, even though the
United States defended its nuclear tests as lawful measures of security,7 7 it
provided Japan with an ex gratia payment of $2 million "for purposes of
compensation for the injuries or damages sustained... [and] in full settlement of
any and all claims against the United
States of America or its agents, nationals or
78
juridical entities" caused by the test.
C. Payments to MarshallIslanders
The United States provide $185 million to the Marshall Island victims of the
U.S. nuclear testing during the 1950S. 7 9 Although this amount is inadequate and
more compensation is being sought, the payment nonetheless provides further

74. J. BARROS AND DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION 75(1974).
75. Boyle, supra note 25, at 296; see also BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 15, at 188-89.
76. Myres McDougal and Norbert Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful
Measuresfor Security, 64 YALE L. J. 648, 652 (1955).
77. Id. at 682-94.
78. Personal and Property Damage Claims Agreement, U.S.-Japan, Jan. 4, 1955, 6 U.S.T. 1,
T.I.A.S. No. 3160.
79. See generally Davor Pevec, The Enewetak People: Nuclear Testing; Displacement;
Resettlement: andLand Damage Claims (published herein).
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recognition that restitution and compensation are required for harm caused by
nuclear activities.
D. The PalomaresNuclear Bomb Accident
After a U.S. B-52 containing four nuclear bombs collided in mid-air with a
refueling tanker and then crashed in the waters near Palomares, Spain on January
17, 1966, spreading plutonium dust over several hundred acres, 80 the United States
accepted responsibility to locate, remove, and dispose of the radioactive materials
in Spanish waters and pay compensation for the injurious consequences of this
act.81
E. The Cosmos 954 Incident
Commentators tend to examine the Cosmos 954 incident for guidance
regarding the obligations of states for environmental damage, even though that
matter was resolved through a negotiated settlement rather than by a third-party
tribunal. On January 24, 1978, a Soviet nuclear-powered surveillance satellite
called the Cosmos 954 left its orbit and crashed in western Canada, spreading its
debris widely over a remote area extending across Alberta, Saskatchewan, and the
Northern Territories.8 2 All but two parts of the satellite were radioactive, and
several pieces contained lethal levels of radioactivity. 83 Canada conducted a
massive search across the area to find the pieces, with the help of the United States
and with limited assistance from the Soviets.84 Canada lodged a claim against the
Soviet Union based on the 1972 Convention on International Liability for
Damages Caused by Space Objects 5 and on general principles of international
law, 86 asserting that international law imposed "absolute liability for space
activities, in particular activities involving the use of nuclear energy, 8 7 and that
"[t]he principle of absolute liability applies to fields of activities having in
common a high degree of risk.",8 8 Canada spent Canadian$14 million in the entire
clean-up operation, 89 but sought only about Canadian$6 million from the
U.S.S.R. 90 for costs "reasonably related to the satellite debris and not including
administrative and other types of expense." 9' Canada did not assert any claim for
property or environmental damage, apparently because its prompt clean-up
80. National Atomic Museum, Broken Arrow, http://www.atomicmuseum.com/tour/cw4.cfm (last
visited Oct. 25, 2006).
81. BRIAN D. SMITH, STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 77, 117 (1988).
82. Claim Against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for Damage Caused by Soviet Cosmos
954, Feb. 8, 1978, 18 I.L.M. 899, 902 [hereinafter Canadian Claim].
83. Id. at 904.
84. Id. at 903.
85. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, supra note 65
[hereinafter Space Damage Convention].
86. Canadian Claim, supra note 82, at 905.
87. Id. at 907.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 904.
90. Id.
91. Eilene Galloway, Nuclear Powered Satellites: The U.S.S.R. Cosmos 904 and the Canadian
Claim, 12 AKRON L. REV.401, 413 (1979).
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operation limited such damage. The U.S.S.R. agreed to pay Canada Canadian$3
million "in full and final settlement of all matters connected with the disintegration
of the Soviet satellite 'Cosmos 954,"' without admitting any liability. 92 Some
commentators have interpreted this settlement as confirming the obligation to
cover clean-up costs in common areas and wilderness areas. 93 The rule that
emerges from this situation is a bit ambiguous, however, because the final
the height of the Cold War, was
settlement, reached through negotiations during
94
for less than the full amount of the damages.
F. The ChernobylAccident April 1986
The catastrophic explosion of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant on April 26,
1986 was "one of the gravest technological disasters in history" 95 with
consequences "of incomparable scale, ' ' 96 and the impact of this event on the
development of customary international law must be examined. 97 For ten days
after the explosion, some 50 million Curie (the amount that would have been put
into the atmosphere from "the simultaneous explosion of 500 A-bombs") was
spewed into the atmosphere. 98 Many millions were affected, and 350,000 were
obliged to abandon their homes, which was a "deeply traumatic experience" for
most. 9 9

Although Chernobyl was built and it exploded during the existence of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, its location after the breakup of the Soviet
Union-within Ukraine but only 12 kilometers from the border with Belarus 100
illustrates the inequity of siting dangerous facilities near international borders,
where one state derives all the benefits of the operation while the other state bears
all the risk. Nearly 70% of the radioactive dust fell on Belarus, and will remain in
the ground of Belarus for thousands of years. 10' After the accident, the Soviet
government in Moscow withheld information about the explosion for several days

92. Protocol on Settlement of Canada's Claim for Damages Caused by "Cosmos 954," Can.U.S.S.R., April 2, 1981,20 I.L.M. 689.
93. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 15, at 192-93.
94. Id. at 193.
95. HANQIN, supra note 18, at 22.
96. Id.
97. See generally Linda A. Malone, The Chernobyl Accident: A Case Study in InternationalLaw
Regulating State Responsibility for Transboundary Nuclear Pollution, 12 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 203
(1987).
98. HANQIN, supra note 18, at 22.
99. Press Release 2005/12, Int'l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Chernobyl: The True Scale of
available at
2005)
[hereinafter
IAEA Press
Release],
the Accident
(Sept.
5,
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/PressReleases/2005/prn2005l2.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2006).
Chernobyl
Trace
in
Belarus,
100. See
BelarusGuide.com,
http://www.belarusguide.com/chemobyll/ctrace.html [hereinafter Cherobyl Trace] (last visited Oct.
27, 2006) (providing more information on the damages suffered by Belarus as a result of transboundary
nuclear pollution from the Chernobyl plant in Ukraine).
101. Ivan A. Kenik, Belarus: a small country faces 70 percent of the fallout, DHA NEWS, SeptOct. 1995, at 7, 7, available at http://chemobyl.undp.org/spanish/otherdoc/fallout.htm (last visited Oct.
27, 2006).
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The effects of radiation may sometimes take years to manifest. Hence, claims
may be brought for monitoring future harms to human health, emotional distress,
and fear of developing nuclear-related diseases. Exposure to nuclear radiation
undoubtedly causes severe emotional distress as a result of the environmental
devastation, possible loss of life, and fear of developing life-threatening diseases.
The possibility of developing such a disease may cause a victim to spend hundreds
on doctor's fees and lab tests to monitor their health and detect the disease early
on.

Some commentators suggest that the failure of other nations to bring claims
against the Soviet Union is an example of state practice recognizing that
international law would not support such claims.' 0 4 Professors Bimie and Boyle
suggest, for instance, that this incident leads to the conclusion that the strict
liability regime may not apply to damage resulting from nuclear activities:
Responses to the Chemobyl disaster provide the most telling evidence
of state practice so far. This accident caused widespread harm to
agricultural produce and livestock in Europe and affected wildlife, in
some cases severely. Clean-up costs were incurred and compensation
was paid by several governments to their own citizens for produce
which was destroyed as a precautionary measure, or which was
rendered unusable. Evidence of long-term health risks has yet to
emerge, but remains possible.

102. See Dr. Christine K. Durback, World Information Transfer, Chomobyl, Misinformation and
Ethics (Sept. 19-22, 2005), available at http://www.worldinfo.org/index.php?id=420 (last visited Oct.
27, 2006) (statement at the 7th Scientific and Practical Conference, Chomobyl Center, Slavutich,
Ukraine).
103. See Chernobyl Trace, supra note 100; Kenik, supra note 101.
104. See, e.g., VED P. NANDA, GEORGE PRING, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 37, 56 n.177 (2003) (characterizing "the affected European states' failure in
turn to make any claims" against the former Soviet Union for the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster
as a "notable exception to the state practice" contrary to the principles of international environmental
law, but later suggesting that "as there are diplomatic reasons why this may have occurred (other
nuclear states not wishing to create a precedent that could haunt them), it is not sufficient to deny the
general practice and opinion juris on this principle"). See also Justin Mellor, Radioactive Waste and
Russia's Northern Fleet: Sinldng the Principlesof InternationalEnvironmentalLaw, 28 DENV. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 51, 65-66 (1999) (stating that "Chernobyl has resulted in a 'polluter gets paid principle,' in
which the polluter becomes the recipient of aid rather than compensating those states that are harmed"
and also stating that the Ukraine had secured $2.3 billion from western nations to close the Chernobyl
plant and begin a full cleanup).
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Despite this provable loss, no claims were made against the Soviet
Union by any affected state, although the possibility was considered by
some governments. Uncertainty over the basis for such a claim,
reluctance to establish a precedent with possible future implications for
states which themselves operate nuclear power plants, and the absence
of any appropriate treaty binding on the Soviet Union are the main
reasons for this silence. It is also unclear whether liability would extend
to damage to the environment, or to the costs of precautionary measures
taken by governments. The Soviet Union made no voluntary offer of
compensation, and questioned the necessity of precautionary measures
taken by its neighbours, maintaining that they suffered little or no
damage. The failure to demand, or to offer compensation in this case
shows the difficulty of reconciling doctrinal support for any standard of
strict or absolute responsibility with the evidence of state practice,
limited as it is. It points to the conclusion that responsibility for a
failure of due diligence, that is for causing avoidable loss only, provides
a more convincing interpretation of the actual practice of states and the
present state of customary law in cases of accidental environmental
damage. 105
Professor Sands provided additional detail in his treatise, explaining that
Sweden asserted that "customary international law.. .principles exist which might
be invoked to support a claim against the USSR," but concluded that "[t]he issues
involved... are complex from the legal as well as the technical point of view" and
hence that "the Government has felt that priority should be given.. .to endeavours
of another nature." 10 6 The United Kingdom reserved its right to present such a
claim, 107 but ultimately declined to do so, perhaps in part because:
The position of the United Kingdom government was complicated by
outstanding disputes relating to the problem of acid rain in Scandinavia,
contamination of the Irish Sea by nuclear waste from the
Windscale/Sellafield nuclear plant, and alleged damage to Australian
territory, from the nuclear tests carried out by the United Kingdom in
08
the 1950s.1
West Germany and the United Kingdom paid compensation to their own
citizens for the losses they incurred after the Chernobyl explosion, and the list of
situations covered by the Germans under their own statute provides an interesting
model of the range of damages appropriate in such situations. Individuals received
payments when:
" Cattle were kept from grazing;
* Milk had to be transformed into cheese, leaving radioactive whey;
105. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 15, at 474.
106. SANDS, supra note 13, at 887-88 (citing Correspondence with the Swedish Embassy in

London, Dec. 10, 1987).
107. Id. at 888.
108. Id.
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" Spring vegetables had to be destroyed or were seized;
" Some kinds of fruits were unsaleable, though they were not all
contaminated;
- The travel and transport industries specializing in Eastern Europe lost
clientele;
" Seasonal farm workers lost their jobs;
" Import restrictions were imposed;
" Sand in playgrounds was replaced;
" Open air meetings were cancelled;
" Recommendations to refrain from eating certain foodstuffs were issued;
- Filters of motor cars and of air-conditioning systems were replaced; and
10 9
-The changing conduct of customers led to a decline in turnover.
The international community did not sit idly by after the Chernobyl tragedy
and has worked to revamp the civil nuclear liability regime, adopting a host of
treaties and domestic legislation. 11 0 More importantly, in our effort to understand
the reactions of the international community to the Chernobyl disaster, it is vital to
recognize that the Soviet Union-and the Russian Federation after the Soviet
Union broke apart--did recognize a duty to provide compensation to the victims of

this tragedy. In fact, the Soviet Union spent $18 billion on Chernobyl
rehabilitation between 1986 and 1991, when the Union split apart. Of this, 35%
went on "social assistance to affected people" and 17% on resettlement. This aid
continued after the Soviet Union broke into 16 separate independent states:
After the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, Chemobyl became a key
factor in domestic politics and in relations between the three new states.
Belarus and Ukraine demanded compensation from Russia for the

effects of the accident... Especially in the case of Belarus and Ukraine,
Chernobyl benefits came to represent a heavy burden on the national
budgets and drained resources away from other areas of public
spending. By the late 1990s, however, scaling them down, or exploring
alternative strategies had become politically impossible."'

109. HANQIN, supra note 18, at 92 n.68 (listing the categories of payments made under Section 38
of the 1985 Atomic Energy Act of the Federal Republic of Germany).
110. See generally BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 15, at 452-99.

111. U.N. Dev. Program [UNDP] & U.N. Int'l Children Emergency Fund [UNICEF], The Human
Consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident: A Strategy for Recovery, 1 2.11, (Jan. 25, 2002)
at
available
added)
(emphasis
Report]
Consequences
Human
[hereinafter
http://www.undp.org/dpa/publications/chemobyl.pdf.
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In 1991, Ukraine enacted The Law on Status and Social Protection of
Population Suffered from Chernobyl Catastrophe, 2 which recognized liability to
the following groups of people:
1. Immediate victims directly exposed to radiation, i.e., the "liquidators"
who worked on the site of the accident or in the exclusion zone in 1986 or
1987.
2. People affected by the accident (divided by three zones of radioactive
contamination: exclusion zone, mandatory relocation zone, and voluntary
relocation zone):
* Those evacuated from the exclusion zone in 1986
* Those who left a voluntary relocation zone after the accident (were
paid to resettle).
- Those who refused to leave and continued to reside in these two zones
Those who returned and lived in the second zone for two years or in
the third zone for three years as of 1993.
-

-

Those working or studying in any of three contaminated zones.

* Those who became ill because of radiation not connected to
Chemobyl accident such as improper disposal of radioactive waste
where no intent was established (causation had to be medically
confirmed)... This statute and other Ukrainian enactments recognized
the following types of injuries as being eligible for compensation:
- Harm to health or loss of ability to work, for those with a medically
confirmed disability traceable to Chemobyl accident; causation was
established upon physical exam after which a person received a
disability document; the medical examination had to be repeated every
three-to-five years to confirm disability and evaluate treatment results,
except for persons with unrecoverable health changes, senior persons,
or persons with Group I or II disability.
"Actual monetary losses caused by relocation or loss of property.
"Death of bread-winner.
The Ukrainian government also accepted responsibility for providing and
covering the expenses for timely medical examination, radiation tests, and medical
treatment of liquidators and other persons affected by the accident. Data on all
liquidators and other individuals affected by the accident have been listed in the
State Register maintained by the Defense Ministry, Internal Affairs Ministry, and
National Security Ministry and are made available to local medical institutions
assigned by the place of residence and to each person individually. The coverage

112. The Law of Ukraine, On Status and Social Protection of Population Suffered from Chomobyl
Catastrophe,
Law
No.
796-XII,
Feb.
28,
1991,
available
at
http://www.welcometo.kiev.ua/iii/ilic.frame-law-result2.show?p arg-names=law-id&p-arg-values=3
25 (last visited Oct. 27, 2006).
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of these programs has been extensive: "benefits were offered to broad categories of
'Chernobyl victims' that expanded to seven million now receiving or eligible for
pensions, special allowances and health benefits, including free holidays and
guaranteed allowances.""13 Those eligible included individuals with a variety of
links to the disaster, and the types of programs established for them responded to
the range of injuries they suffered:
The system of compensation payments established after the accident
reflected a Soviet practice of, in effect, compensating exposure to risk

rather than actual injury. Belarusian and Russian legislation provides
more than seventy, and Ukrainian legislation more than fifty, different
privileges and benefits for Chernobyl victims, depending on factors
such as the degree of invalidity and the level of contamination. 114
The pensions provided for Chemobyl disability groups included the following
categories:
•Group I disabled person (liquidator) - $2,820/month
" Group II - $2,115/month
" Group III- $1,410/month
" Disabled child - $470/month

" Family that lost a bread-winner - $2,820/month
" Parents of a deceased person - $1,410/month
Compensatory programs also provided the following additional reimbursements
and privileges:
" Pensions to compensate harm to health (for persons capable of working)
" Payments in addition to earned wages and harmful-work-condition payments
to persons working in contaminated zones
" State housing provided to liquidators and evacuees
" Priority rights to state housing for other affected persons
"Paid medical examinations; mandatory irradiation tests; paid medical
treatment and medicines
"Paid social and psychological rehabilitation services
" Paid health holidays
" Priority admission to universities
" Paid public transportation for liquidators
Health holidays are paid health vacations or trips to sanatoria in addition to
normal vacation time:
Health holidays in sanatoria and summer camps are fully financed by
the authorities for invalids, liquidators, people who continue to live in
highly contaminated areas, children and adolescents... In
113. IAEA Press Release, supra note 99.
114. Human Consequences Report, supra note 111, 2.16 (emphasis added).

2006

LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION

Belarus.. children living in areas with contamination at a level above
5Ci/km2 (five Curies per square kilometer) have the right to two
months holiday.. .in the year 2000, 293,895 Belarussian children and
adults were provided with such holidays. A similar situation exists in
Ukraine. 11
The range and variety of these programs establish clearly that the Soviet
Union, and the Russian Federation as its successor, did accept the duty to
compensate the victims of this tragedy, at least in the (new) countries immediately
surrounding the event and those most immediately affected by it. Although no
offers of compensation were extended to victims in countries more distant from the
explosion, the amount and types of compensatory programs established for those in
the surrounding countries do reflect an acceptance of a strict-liability level of
responsibility by the Soviet Union and by the Russian Federation.
116
V. THE INADEQUATE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR LIABILITY TREATY REGIME
A patchwork of treaties has been drafted to address injuries resulting from
nuclear activities, but they are not widely ratified and they leave many questions
unresolved. The liability of the operator of a nuclear installation is wellestablished by these treaties, but they do not address carrier, supplier or financier
liability. The treaty framework also imposes limits on liability and statutes of
limitations on claims arising out of nuclear accidents.
The two primary conventions that create a special regime of civil liability for
nuclear damage are the 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field
of Nuclear Energy, 117 promulgated by the Organization of Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for
Nuclear Damage,"18 promulgated by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA). The low liability limits in these treaties were increased somewhat in 1963
in the Brussels Supplementary Convention. " 9 These conventions were then linked
by the Joint Protocol of 1988,120 which combined the two Conventions into one
expanded liability regime. Parties to the Joint Protocol are treated as if they are
parties to both the Paris and Vienna Conventions. 121

115. Id.1 2.21.
116. Duncan E.J. Currie, Limited Liability. Unlimited Risk: The Problems and Gaps in the Existing
Treaties (Vienna and Paris Treaties) and an Analysis of How an Actual Claim Would Be Brought
Under the Current Existing Treaty Regime in the Event of a Nuclear Accident, published herein
(discussing the issues concerning the inadequate international treaty regime).
117. Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29, 1960, 956
U.N.T.S. 263 [hereinafter 1960 Paris Convention].
118. Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, 1063 U.N.T.S. 265,
2 I.L.M.727.
119. Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29th July 1960 on Third Party Liability
in the Field of Nuclear Energy, Jan. 31, 1963, 1041 U.N.T.S. 358, 2 I.L.M. 685,
120. IAEA, Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris
Convention, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/402 (Sept. 21, 1988).
121. Id. at art. IV.
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These Conventions impose strict liability on the operator of the plant for
nuclear damage and require it to demonstrate financial security to cover costs
brought on by the accident, mainly in the form of insurance. This liability regime
has been criticized, however, as essentially immunizing the manufacturer and
122
The
supplier of the nuclear facility by holding the operator strictly liable.
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may take many more years to manifest. Another flaw in these early treaties was
that they did not cover environmental damage. The Vienna Convention held the
operator liable for "nuclear damage," which is defined simply as "loss of life, any
damage to, property which arises out of or results
personal injury or any loss of, or
123
from... a nuclear installation."'
In September 1997, more than 80 countries signed a Protocol to Amend the
1963 Vienna Convention124 and also adopted a Convention on Supplementary
Compensation for Nuclear Damage 125 at the IAEA headquarters to address these
concerns, but these new documents have not been widely ratified. The Protocol
extended the definition of nuclear damage to include the concepts of
environmental damage and preventive measures. Under the Protocol, "nuclear
damage" now includes not only loss of life, personal injury, and loss of or damage
to property, but also:
each of the following to the extent determined by the law of the
competent court.., the costs of measures of reinstatement of impaired

environment, unless such impairment is insignificant, if such measures
are actually taken or to be taken, and insofar as not included in subparagraph (ii) [regarding loss of or damage to property]... [and] the
costs of preventive measures, and further loss or damage caused by such
measures. 126

Although this language increases the range of compensable damages, one
commentator has pointed out that is still less generous than the West German
government was in providing compensation to its own citizens after the Chernobyl
explosion. 127 The Protocol increased the possible limit of the operator's liability to
not less than 300 million Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), which is equal to
approximately $400 million, and extended the statute of limitation governing
claims of loss of life and personal injury. In 2004, an additional protocol increased

122. 1963 Vienna Convention, supra note 118, art. I1,5 (stating that "no person other than the
operator shall be liable for nuclear damage").
123. Id. at art. III, 1(k).
124. IAEA, Protocolto Amend the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liabilityfor NuclearDamage,
36 I.L.M. 1454, Sept. 12, 1997 [hereinafter 1997 IAEA Protocol].
125. IAEA, Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, IAEA Doc.
INFCIRC/567 (Sept. 12, 1997).
126. 1997 IAEA Protocol, supra note 124, art. II, 2 (emphasis added).
127. HANQIN, supra note 18, at 92 n.68 (listing compensable categories).
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the liability limits further to a total28of 1.5 billion euros, which would be provided
by governmental funding sources.'
This limit is still grossly inadequate, as can be seen by comparison to the
estimate of 5,000 billion euros as the total damage of a reactor meltdown in
Germany. 29 After the 1986 Chemobyl accident, according to one estimate,
Belarus suffered economic damages of US$235 billion. 3 ° The International
Atomic Energy Agency has declined to identify a specific figure for the extent of
the Chernobyl damage, but has acknowledged that "[a] variety of estimates from
the 1990s placed the costs over two decades at hundreds of billions of dollars."131
For further comparison, the claims for damages after the breakup of the Prestige
to about 700 million euros
oil tanker off the cost of Spain in November 20023came
2
in Spain and another 100 million euros in France. 1
The Paris and Vienna Conventions, as supplemented by the Brussels
Convention and linked by the Joint Protocol, hold that the treaties ratified by the
country where the nuclear installation is located will govern. 133 These conventions
hold that an operator will be liable for damages occurring during the transportation
of nuclear material in two situations: (1) for material originating from its plant
before liability involving the material has been assumed by another operator, and
(2) for material being sent to its plant after it has assumed liability. 134 In the
second case, if the material is coming from a state that is not a member of the
treaty, the receiving operator will be liable after the material has been loaded on
the means of transport by which it is to be carried. 135 The Maritime Liability
Convention 116 exonerates anyone liable for damage caused by a nuclear accident if
the operator of the installation is held liable under the Paris or Vienna
Convention. 137 Many gaps exist in the current treaty framework for transportation
of nuclear materials. The definition of damage does not clearly include damage to
the environment and consequential losses (such as fisheries and tourism) and the
liability of other parties such as carriers, suppliers or financiers is not addressed.
128. Protocol to Amend the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of
29 July 1960, art. I(H), 2004 O.J. (L 97) 55.
129. H.J. Ewers & K. Rennings, Economics of Nuclear Risks - a German Study, in SOCIAL COSTS
OF ENERGY: PRESENT STATUS AND FUTURE TRENDS 150-66 (0. Hohmeyer and R. Ottinger eds., 1992).
130. Press Release, Embassy of the Republic of Belarus in the United States of America, Chernobyl
After 19 Years: Problems of Rehabilitation and Sustainable Development (Apr. 22, 2005),
http://www.belarusembassy.org/news/digests/pr042505.htm.
131. IAEA Press Release, supranote 99.
132. Louise Angelique de La Fayette, New Approaches for Addressing Damage to the Marine
Environment,20 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 176 (2005).
133. 1963 Vienna Convention, supra note 118, art. lI(l)(b); 1960 Paris Convention, supra note
118, art. 4(a) & (b); IAEA Joint Protocol, supra note 120, art. 111(3); see also Jon M. Van Dyke, The
Legal Regime Governing Sea Transport of Ultrahazardous Radioactive Materials, 33 OCEAN DEV. &
INT'L L. 77, 81-82 (2002).
134. 1963 Vienna Convention, supra note 118, art. 11(1).
135. See id. at art. ll(l)(c).
136. Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material,
Dec. 17, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 255, 11 I.L.M. 277.
137. Id. at art. I.
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The failure of the international community to develop a comprehensive and
adequate liability and compensation regime is the equivalent of providing an
enormous subsidy to support the nuclear industry. It should be obvious that any
limits on liability are inconsistent with the polluter-pays principle.
A. What Does a Sound Liability Regime Require?
The patch-work and poorly-ratified treaties governing nuclear liability do not
constitute a sound liability regime on this topic. To provide appropriate coverage
for those put at risk by this activity, the regime would need to include:
" Strict liability as the governing standard
" No monetary limits on liability
" A broad definition of damages, that includes damages resulting from
perceived fears from an incident even if no measurable radioactivity has
yet been released
" Access to a neutral tribunal by those bringing claims
" Ability to bring claims against all contributing parties-operators,
suppliers, financiers, relevant governments, and, in the case of transport
situations, shippers and owners of the cargo
" No statute of limitations
" The establishment of an adequate compensation fund
B. The Challenge of DeterminingDamages
The acceptance by the international community of the no-harm rule and the
polluter-pays principle establishes that a country initiating an activity that causes
harm to its neighbors bears the responsibility to provide compensation for the
injuries suffered, but disagreements remain regarding how to define the "damage"
that requires payment. This question is crucial because a partial or inadequate
payment may leave the injured neighbor in a greatly weakened situation. Only if
the country where the harm occurred is required to pay for all the damages suffered
will the costs of the activity be truly "internalized." If less than complete
compensation is provided, the injured neighbors will essentially be subsidizing the
state conducting the harm-producing activity. The nuclear industry has historically
been subsidized by governments and, as a result of the failure to develop a
comprehensive liability and compensation program, by the international
community. Allowing the nuclear industry to be responsible for only some of the
damage it causes to neighbors who receive no benefit from the nuclear activity is
an enormous subsidy to this industry.
The International Law Commission's 2001 Draft Articles on State
Responsibility define the duty of the state with jurisdiction over the activity
causing the harm in the following language:
1. The responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation
for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.
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2. Injury includes any damage, whether material or moral, caused by
38
the internationally wrongful act of a State. 1
As explained above, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in
the Chorzow Factory Case stated that "reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out
all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in
all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed."' 139 But the reality
has often been that less than full compensation has been provided after injuries
have been caused. What about losses of opportunity and lost profits? What about
the damages that result from fears, which may or may not be reasonable? What are
"moral" damages, and when must they be paid?
The Commentary to the ILC Draft Articles defines the operative terms as
follows:
"Material" damage here refers to damage to property or other interests
of the State and its nationals which is assessable in financial terms.
"Moral" damage includes such things as individual pain and suffering,
loss of loved ones or personal affront associated with an intrusion on
40
one's home or private life. 1
The Commentary offers the French attack on the Greenpeace vessel Rainbow
Warriorin Auckland, New Zealand as an example where moral damages had been
appropriately awarded because France's intentional and clearly unlawful assault on
the vessel "provoked indignation and public outrage in New Zealand and caused a
new, additional non-material damage... of a moral, political and legal nature,
resulting from the affront to the dignity and prestige not only of New Zealand as
such, but of its highest judicial and executive authorities as well." 141
The preferred form of remedy for an internationally wrongful act is "to reestablish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed,
provided and to the extent that restitution: (a) is not materially impossible; (b) does
not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution
instead of compensation."' 142 Thus, what is called "specific performance" in
Anglo-American law is obligatory, rather than monetary damages, unless
reestablishing the previous situation is impossible or unless "there is a grave
disproportionality between the burden which restitution would impose on the
responsible State and the benefit which would be gained, either by the injured State

138. ILC ARTICLES, supra note 6, at 201 (emphasis added).
139. Factory at Chorz6w, supra note 28.
140. ILC

ARTICLES,

supra note 6, at 202.

141. Id. at 203 (quoting Rainbow Warrior Affair (N.Z. v. Fr.), 20 R.I.A.A. 217, 267 109 (1990)).
Some tribunals have viewed the award of punitive damages as appropriate under international law. See,
e.g., I'm Alone Case (Can. v. U.S.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1609, 1618 (where the Commissioners recommended
that, in addition to compensatory damages, the United States be required to pay $25,000 to Canada for
intentionally sinking a Canadian ship); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F.Supp. 860, 864 (D.N.Y. 1984)
(explaining that because Paraguay had failed to prosecute its official for his act of torture "the objective
of the international law making torture punishable as a crime can only be vindicated by imposing
punitive damages").
142. ILC ARTICLES, supra note 6, at 213.
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' 143
This language requires only "the situation that
or by any victim of the breach."
44
existed prior to the occurrence of the wrongful act" be reestablished,' but the
next article then confirms that if this restitution does not adequately cover all
damage, additional compensation must be provided "including loss of profits
145
The goal thus must be to ensure that the remedy
insofar as it is established."'
"should be commensurate with the loss, so that the injured party may be made
whole."' 146 The ILC Commentary47points out that numerous tribunals have awarded
1
compensation for loss of profits.

Especially when injuries to environmental biodiversity and environmental
amenities are involved, it will be difficult to value such losses in monetary terms,
but "[d]amage to such environmental values... is, as a matter of principle, no less
real and compensable than damage to property, though it may be difficult to
quantify.' ' 148 In 1993, the Council of Europe negotiated the Lugano Convention
on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the
Environment, 149 but it has not yet been widely ratified. This treaty says that
"compensation for the impairment of the environment, other than for loss of profit
from such impairment, shall be limited to the costs of measures of reinstatement
50
actually undertaken or to be undertaken,"'1 and it further says that "measures of
reinstatement" are limited to "any reasonable measures aiming to reinstate or
restore damaged or destroyed components of the environment, or to introduce,
' 51
where reasonable, the equivalent of these components into the environment."'
The irony of this type of formula is that an operator or state that causes damage so
devastating that it is beyond repair-such as the vaporization of an island in a
nuclear test-would be left in a better position (because no attempt to reinstate the
lost island would be undertaken) than an operator or state that has caused damage
but has repaired it.
Most commentators appear to believe that "[flor legal recovery, damage must
be quantifiable and certain,"' 152 and must thus be:
[M]easured in economic units as suffered by other States, e.g. loss of
tourism or damage to the fishing industry, or in terms of the costs of
removal and restoration. Environmental values are considered in each
particular context using a criterion based on the nature and extent of

143. Id. at 217.
144. Id.at213.
at218.
145. Id.
146. Id. at219 (quoting Lusitania Cases (U.S.v.F.R.G.), 7 R.I.A.A. 32, 39 (1923)).
147. Id.at 228 (citing, e.g., Cape Hom Pigeon Case (U.S. v. Russ.), 9 R.I.A.A. 63 (1902); Sapphire
Int'l Petroleums Ltd. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., 35 I.L.R. 136 (1963)); Factory at Chorz6w, supra note
28, at 47-48, 53; Libyan American Oil Co. v. Libya, 62 I.L.R. 140 (1977).
148. Id. at 223.
149. Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the
Environment, June 21, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1228.
150. Id.at art. 2(7)(c).
151. Id. at art. 2(8).
152. HANQIN, supra note 18, at 252.
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human use as well as on the availability of the natural resource53to
human society with the currently available and feasible technology. 1
Professor Sands has explained that "[in relation to environmental damage...
the liability rules are still evolving and in need of further development."' 154 This
effort is crucial because the goal of the polluter-pays principle-the internalization
of the true costs of any endeavor-can only be achieved if the real costs to society
are attributed to the activity that causes pollution and environmental degradation.
If environmental resources are viewed as "public goods" that can be polluted and
degraded without cost (the "free-rider theory"), then the public will be subsidizing
Only when the true costs of
the operations destroying the environment.
environmental degradation are charged to the operator and the state involved will
production costs and enjoy
they "tend to cut back on pollution in order to minimize
55
greater profits, thus internalizing social costs."1
One example of a court trying to address "the extremely difficult substantive
issues concerning damages" to the environment is Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
v. SS Zoe Colocotroni,156 decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
in 1980. After carefully analyzing U.S. and Puerto Rican statutes, the court
concluded that the measure of damages was not limited "to the loss of market
value of the real estate affected,"1 57 and explained the proper measure as follows:
We think the appropriate primary standard for determining damages in a
case such as this is the cost reasonably to be incurred by the sovereign
or its designated agency to restore or rehabilitate the environment in the
affected area to its pre-existing condition, or as close thereto as is
feasible without grossly disproportionate expenditures. 158
This challenge was also faced by the United Nations Compensation
Commission, which was established by the Security Council 1991 to evaluate
claims against Iraq that arose out of the first Gulf War. " 9 This assignment was
daunting because "[t]here is hardly any direct international precedent for valuation
of similar environmental losses in international law." 160 The Commission received

153. Id. at 253.
154. SANDS, supra note 13, at 869 (for examples of efforts to determine and compensate for
environmental harm, see 918-22). See EDWARD H.P. BRANS, LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE TO PUBLIC
NATURAL RESOURCES: STANDING, DAMAGE AND DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (Kluwer Law International

2001) (for a comprehensive overview of this issue). See also HANQIN, supra note 18, at 93; Alan
Boyle, Reparationfor Environmental Damage in International Law: Some Preliminary Problems, in
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW: PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION

AND VALUATION 17-26 (Michael Bowman and Alan Boyle eds., 2002).
155. HANQIN, supra note 18, at 323.
156. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. The SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 670 (1st Cir. 1980).
157. Id. at 674.
158. Id. at 675.
159. S.C. Res. 692, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/692 (May 20, 1991); S.C. Res. 687, 18, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991); The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-general Pursuant to
Paragraph19 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), 3-4, U.N. Doe. S/22559 (May 2, 1991).
160. Mojtaba Kazazi, Environmental Damage in the Practice of the UN Compensation
Commission, in ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW: PROBLEMS
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170 claims for environmental damage and depletion of natural resources, claiming
US$64 billion in damages.
Claims regarding nuclear activities generally fall into one of four categories:
(1) claims brought before the plant begins operation under equitable theories or for
161
and the Aarhus
failure to comply with treaties such as the Espoo Convention
162
before
information
which require nuclear operators to provide
Convention,
or
property
harm
operation; (2) claims brought after a nuclear accident for physical
damage; (3) claims brought after a nuclear accident for damage caused to the
environment and consequential losses, such as a decline in tourism or fisheries;
and (4) claims brought after a nuclear accident, but before any physical injury, for
emotional distress or fear of developing a disease.
The 1997 Protocol to the Vienna Convention allows claims to be filed for
"damages to persons or property," "economic loss arising from the loss of life or
any personal injury or loss of or damage to property; the costs of measures of
reinstatement of impaired environment; loss of income derived from an economic
interest in any use or enjoyment of the environment incurred as a result of a
significant impairment of environment; the costs of preventive measures and
further loss of damage caused by such measures; and any other economic loss, if
3
permitted by the general law on civil liability of the competent court., 16 P.S. Rao
has summarized the law on damages as follows:
(j) The definition of damage eligible for compensation as we have seen
above is not a well-settled matter. Damage to persons and property is
generally compensable. Damage to environment or natural resources
within the jurisdiction or in areas under the control of a State is now
well accepted. However, compensation in such a case is limited to costs
actually incurred on account of prevention or response measures as well
as measures of restoration... Where actual restoration of damaged
environment or natural resources is not possible, costs incurred to
introduce equivalent elements could be reimbursed;
(k) Damage to environment per se, not resulting in any direct loss to
proprietary or possessory interests of individuals or the State is not
considered a fit case for compensation. Similarly, loss of profits and
tourism on account of environmental damage are not likely to get
compensated. 164
The costs incurred to restore the environment from the injuries suffered are
compensable under the 1997 Supplementary Compensation Convention if they are
"reasonable," "have been approved by the competent authorities of the State," and
are designed to "reinstate or restore damaged or destroyed components of the
OF DEFINITION AND VALUATION 111,

121 (Michael Bowman and Alan Boyle eds. 2002).

161. Espoo Convention, supranote 51.
162. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to
Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 517.
163. Rao, supra note 23, 88.
164. Id. 153(j)-(k).
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environment, or to introduce, 65where reasonable, the equivalent of these
components in the environment." 1
VI. CLAIMS FOR ANTICIPATED HEALTH HAZARDS AND FEAR OF ENVIRONMENTAL

HARM
Can claims be brought against nuclear operators based on fears presented by a
nuclear facility sited close to an international border, or based on fears presented
by vessels carrying ultrahazardous nuclear materials near fragile coastal areas, or
brought after a nuclear accident based on the fear of developing a nuclear-related
disease? Professors Birnie and Boyle have concluded that "states are not debarred
by international law from acquiring and using nuclear technology simply because
it poses a risk of injury to other states or to the environment, nor are they precluded
from siting nuclear installations near borders."' 166 They do recognize, however,
that "states must notify and consult their neighbours in cases of serious or
appreciable transboundary risk, with a view to ensuring reasonable regard for the
rights and legitimate interests of other states."' 16 7 And they go on to suggest that
the best approach-to balance the right of each state to govern activities within its
own territory with the need to protect neighboring states "from unilaterally
determined nuclear risks"168-would be to establish a requirement "comparable to
that which applied certain cases of dumping at sea, requiring prior consultation and
approval of the relevant international organization."'' 69 Other authors have issued
stronger opinions, stating that activities carrying the risk of catastrophic damages
should be impermissible unless there is "a special relationship between riskcreating and risk-exposed states, such as reciprocity of170risk creation or a sharing in
the benefits to be derived from the proposed activity."'
The Pacific Island countries concerned about the risks created by the
shipments of ultrahazardous nuclear cargos through their adjacent waters have
complained repeatedly about the inadequate liability regime governing potential
accidents. At the October 1999 meeting of the Pacific Island Forum, for instance,
the leaders specifically called for a compensation regime to be established that
would provide redress for all economic losses, including those that their tourism
and fishing industries might suffer as a result of an incident "even if there is no
actual environmental damage caused."' 17' The islanders are concerned that tourists
165. Supplementary Convention, supra note 125,
g.; David D. Caron, Finding Out What the
Oceans Claim: The 1991 Gulf War, the Marine Environment, and the United Nations Compensation
Commission, in BRINGING NEW LAW TO OCEAN WATERS 393, 399 (David D. Caron & Harry N.
Scheiber eds. 2004)(explaining the Commission recommendation that US$243,234,967 be awarded to
claimants for monitoring and assessing the impact of Iraq's activities on environmental resources
resulting from Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait).
166. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 15, at 470.

167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Gunter Handl, An InternationalLegal Perspective on the Conduct of Abnormally Dangerous
Activities in FrontierAreas: The Case of Nuclear PowerPlant Siting, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 35-36 (1978).
171. Thirtieth South Pacific Forum, Koror, Palau, Oct. 3-5, 1999, Forum Communique, 31,
availableat http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/spacific/regionaIorgs/spf3o communique.html.
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would stop visiting their islands and consumers would stop buying their fish if
some event involving a nuclear cargo occurred, because of their fears of
contamination, even if no measurable radioactivity had been recorded. In 2004,
the Forum Communique repeated this concern:
Leaders reiterated their concerns about possible economic loss in a nonrelease situation and sought an assurance from shipping States that
where there is a demonstrable link between the incident and economic
loss Forum countries would not be left to carry such a loss unsupported
by the shipping States. 172
Courts in the United States have analyzed these "fear of cancer" claims under
several theories: emotional distress, enhanced risk of disease claims, and claims for
medical monitoring.
A. EmotionalDistress
In the United States, a claim can be brought for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress (NIED) where a defendant negligently causes one to suffer
emotional injuries. 173 Although a majority of courts in the United States hold that
a claim for NIED must stem from physical injury, many courts have abolished this
strict physical impact rule. 174
Most courts require proof of four essential elements: (1) the plaintiff must
have been exposed to toxic substances, (2) the fear of a certain disease must be a
result of a present injury, (3) the fear must be reasonable, and (4) the fear must be
causally related to the defendant's negligence. 75 In Metro-North Commuter
RailroadCo. v. Buckley, a case involving a railroad employee who brought a claim
for emotional distress as a result of asbestos exposure, the U.S. Supreme Court
identified the main policy consideration for denying recovery based on fear of
cancer claims - even if reasonable - absent physical injury. The Court stated that
"in a world of limited resources... a rule permitting immediate large-scale
recoveries for widespread emotional distress caused by fear of future disease

172. Thirty-Fifth Pacific Islands Forum, Apia, Samoa, Aug. 5-7, 2004, Forum Communique, 30,
available at http://www.forumsec.org.fj/news/2004/August/Aug_09.htm.
173. J.D. Lee & Barry A. Lindahl, 4 Modem Tort Law § 32.03 (2006) (stating that intentional
infliction of emotional distress (lIED) is a recognized cause of action where a plaintiff can prove: (1)
intentional or reckless conduct; (2) that is extreme and outrageous; (3) which causes severe emotional
distress.
174. See Taylor v. Baptist Med. Ctr., Inc., 400 So. 2d 369, 374 (Ala. 1981) (holding that patient
would not be precluded from recovering from physician for mental anguish caused by his failure to
attend patient's labor and delivery of child, even though no actual physical injury was claimed); Molien
v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 819 (Cal. 1980) (holding that the unqualified requirement of
physical injury is no longer justifiable); Rodrigues v. State of Hawaii, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970)
(holding that serious mental distress may be found where a reasonable man, normally constituted,
would be unable to adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the
case).
175. See Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1997); Potter v.
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co, 863 P.2d 795, 805-06 (Cal. 1993).
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the likelihood of recovery by those who later suffer from the
[would] diminish
17 6
disease."
In those jurisdictions that require a showing of physical harm, however, many
courts have allowed recovery for NIED where the plaintiff could prove "an
objectively verifiable psychological condition, such as depression or anxiety
serious enough to require medical treatment."' 177 Thus, many courts adopt the
view that the physical impact rule, in the context of toxic torts, is flawed because it
ignores the fact that oftentimes the plaintiffs emotional harm is a true injury that
does not manifest itself physically.
In line with this trend, some courts now allow recovery for the fear of
developing a disease absent a showing of physical injury. In In re Moorenovich,
the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine held that an asbestos worker's
current fear that he would contract cancer in the future was a recoverable element
of damages where asbestos was a known carcinogen, the worker had had
prolonged exposure to asbestos, and his coworkers were dying at a higher than
normal rate from asbestos-related cancer. The court further required "that any
anxiety must have been proximately caused by plaintiffs exposure to asbestos.
Moreover, the anxiety must be reasonable. Finally, defendants must be legally
responsible for the plaintiff s exposure to asbestos." 78
In Mauro v. Owens-CorningFiberglass Corp., a New Jersey appellate court
similarly allowed a plaintiff to recover for emotional distress from exposure to
asbestos absent any physical manifestations, noting that "mental and emotional
distress is just as real as physical pain." The court held that bodily injury or
sickness is not required to obtain
damages for fear of cancer as long as there is a
79
reasonable basis for that fear. 1
In Lavelle v. Owens-CorningFiberglasCorp., an Ohio court set forth a threepart test for NIED in toxic tort cases: (1) the plaintiff must be aware that he in fact
possesses an increased statistical likelihood of developing a disease; (2) this
knowledge creates a reasonable fear; and (3) the apprehension manifests itself in
emotional distress. 180 In Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., the New Jersey court
established four factors that must be present in toxic tort NIED cases: (1) the
injured party must be currently suffering from serious fear or emotional distress or

176. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 521 U.S. at 435-36 (holding that an employee could not
recover under for negligently inflicted emotional distress unless he manifested symptoms of the disease
and a separate cause of action was not available to allow employee to recover lump-sum medical
monitoring costs).
177. Jason Yearout, Fear of Future Harm in Toxic Tort Litigation: The Appropriate Measure of
Damages, 22 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 639, 644 (1999).
178. In re Moorenovich, 634 F. Supp. 634, 637 (D. Mc. 1986).
179. Muaro v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 542 A.2d 16, 21-22 (N,J, Super. Ct. App. Div.
1988), aff'd, 561 A.2d 257 (N.J. 1989).
180. Lavelle v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 30 Ohio Misc. 2d 11, 11-14 (Ohio Com. P1. 1987)
(holding that a plaintiff suffering from asbestosis may not recover for the increased risk of cancer, but
may be compensated for increased fear of cancer where this knowledge springs a reasonable
apprehension which manifests itself in mental distress).
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a clinically diagnosed phobia of the future harm; (2) the fear was proximately
the
caused by exposure to the contaminant; (3) the plaintiffs fear of developing
8
'
responsible.'
legally
are
defendants
the
(4)
and
illness is reasonable;
B. EnhancedRisk of Disease Claims
Many courts have resolved these claims under an enhanced risk theory by
adhering to the general requirement that the plaintiff must show a physical injury,
but adopting the view that the enhanced risk of disease itself is the present injury.
The Fifth Circuit has held, for instance, that, under Texas law, the "inhalation of
[asbestos] fibers and the invasion of his body by those fibers" caused him physical
damage and held that recovery may extend to fear of future conditions that will, in
medical probability, develop from presently existing injuries. 8 2 Similarly, in
Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., the federal district court allowed residents to
recover damages for emotional distress that stemmed from their ingestion and
contact with chemical wastes, which leached into the local aquifer, and for fear
which reasonably and naturally flowed from disclosure of the nature and possible
effects of those chemical wastes. 183 In that case, the court recognized that
enhanced susceptibility is an existing condition, and not a speculative future injury,
and courts have regularly upheld awards for such a claim.' 84 Other courts have
to the majority view that
rejected this approach, however, and have adhered
85
1
injury.
compensable
a
not
is
susceptibility
enhanced
C. Medical Monitoring Claims
The best chance of recovery in a U.S. court would be a claim for medical
monitoring damages. In this line of cases, the plaintiff is allowed to recover
"anticipated costs of long-term diagnostic testing necessary to detect latent
86
diseases that may develop as a result of tortious exposure to toxic substances.'1
This compensation is available to plaintiffs who can establish liability based upon
a recognized tort, such as negligence, strict liability, trespass, and intentional
conduct.
In Bower v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia held Westinghouse liable for medical monitoring costs for
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negligently exposing plaintiffs to toxic substances contained in a pile of debris
from the manufacture of light bulbs. The court recognized that at least six other
states have recognized claims for medical monitoring and rejected the contention
that a claim for future medical expenses must rest upon the existence of present
physical harm.1 87 Instead, the court enumerated six elements of a claim for
medical monitoring:
(1) [The plaintiff] has, relative to the general population, been
significantly exposed; (2) to a proven hazardous substance; (3) through
the tortious conduct of the defendant; (4) as a proximate result of the
exposure, plaintiff has suffered an increased risk of contracting a
serious latent disease; (5) the increased risk of disease makes it
reasonable necessary for the plaintiff to undergo periodic diagnostic
medical examinations different from what would be prescribed in the
absence of the exposure; and (6) monitoring procedures exist that make
the early detection of a disease possible. 188
In 2006, the West Virginia Supreme Court followed and applied Bowers in
West Virginia Rezulin Litigation v. Hutchison, confirming that a "cause of action
exists under West Virginia law for the recovery of medical monitoring costs,
where it can be proven that such expenses are necessary and reasonably certain to
be incurred as a proximate result of a defendant's tortious conduct."' 8 9 In West
Virginia, the court explained, "the 'injury' that underlies a claim for medical
monitoring-just as with any other cause of action sounding in tort-is the
'invasion of any legally protected interest."" 90 Once plaintiffs can show that they
have "a significantly increased risk of contracting a particular disease relative to
what would be the case in the absence of exposure" and that "medical monitoring
is, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, necessary in order to diagnose
properly the warning signs of disease.. .even if the disease it is intended to
diagnose is not reasonably certain to occur," then the plaintiffs are entitled to
damages sufficient to cover the medical monitoring costs. 191
According to a 2000 article in the ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER, 18 states
then recognized a cause of action for medical monitoring, 192 but these courts were
split on whether plaintiffs must demonstrate a present physical injury or only that
they were exposed to a toxic material. The following year, the Supreme Court of
Nevada ruled that Nevada common law did not recognize a cause of action for
medical monitoring, but that "[a] remedy of medical monitoring may be available
for an underlying cause of action" based in tort and contract. 193 In 2005, a U.S.
district court explained that medical monitoring is still "novel" and that some
187. Id.
188. Id. at 432-33.
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courts treat it as an "independent cause of action," some as "a form of damages for
an underlying tort, such as negligence or strict liability," and that "[ojf the states
claim or form of
recognizing medical monitoring claims as an 19independent
4
damages, some require a present physical injury."
VII. CONCLUSION
This survey of settled norms and unresolved issues demonstrates that further
work is needed to develop a comprehensive and authoritative regime to govern
harm from nuclear activities. Although it is clear that both the operators of nuclear
facilities and the states that have jurisdiction over them would be responsible to
provide restitution and compensation for such harm under a strict liability regime,
the types of injuries that must be compensated and the range of damages that must
be covered remain subjects of controversy. Although the underlying customary
international law principles (the no-harm principle and the polluter-pays principle)
are clear, the actual treaties that have been drafted are inadequate and they have not
been widely ratified. Victims of damage from nuclear activities would have
difficulty finding a neutral tribunal in which to bring their claims and would face
procedural obstacles including caps on liabilities and inappropriate statutes of
limitations as well as difficulties regarding proof of damages. The failure to
develop a proper regime that would ensure full restitution and compensation for
harm resulting from nuclear facilities constitutes a continuing subsidy to the
nuclear industry and distorts decisions regarding energy choices. The effort to
update international nuclear law must, therefore, continue until a proper liability
and compensation regime is established.
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